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Abstract
We discuss an interpretation of the Dempster-Shafer updating rule for belief
functions in terms of unanimity games, utilizing the additivity of the core operation.
This interpretation leads us to a simple proof for the equivalence of Dempster-Shafer
updating rule and the maximum likelihood updating rule.
Key words: capacity; belief functions Dempster-Shafer updating; maximum likeli-
hood; unanimity game; additivity of the core.
1 Notation and basic facts
We use the following notation and definitions.. $\Omega$ is a finite set. Each element $\omega$ $\in\Omega$ is called a state.. $\mathcal{F}=2^{\Omega}\backslash \{\emptyset\}$ is the collection of all non-empty subsets of 0. For each $E\in$ $l$ , we
write $r_{E}=\{S\in F : S\cap E\neq \mathit{1}\}$ .. A functio$\mathrm{n}$ $v$ : $2^{\Omega}arrow \mathbb{R}$ with $\mathrm{v}(0)=0$ is a game and identified with a point in $\mathbb{R}^{F}$ ,. A game $v\in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{F}}$ $\mathrm{i}$ a capacity if it is non-negative ($\mathrm{v}(0)\geq 0$ for all $S\in \mathcal{F}$), monotone
($v(S)\leq v(T)$ if $S\subseteq T$), and normalized $(v(\Omega)=1)$ .. A game $v\in \mathbb{R}^{F}$ is additive if $\mathrm{v}(0)+\mathrm{v}(\mathrm{T})=v(S\cup T)$ for $S$, $T\in \mathcal{F}$ with $S\cap T=\emptyset$ .
An additive capacity is called a probability function. The set of all the probability
functions is denoted by $\Delta(\Omega)$ .
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. A game $v\in \mathbb{R}^{F}$ is convex (or supermodular) if $v(S)+$ v(T) $\leq v(S\cup T)+v(S\cap T)$
for all $S$, $T\in F.$. For $T\in F,$ denote by $u_{T}\in \mathbb{R}^{F}$ the unanimity game on $T$ : it is a game such that
$u_{T}(S)=1$ if $T\subseteq S$ and $\mathrm{v}(\mathrm{S})=0$ otherwise. A unanimity game is a convex
capacity, so is any convex combination of them.. For $v\in \mathbb{R}^{F}$ , its conjugate $v’\in \mathbb{R}^{F}$ is defined by the rule $v’(S)=v(\Omega)-v(S^{\mathrm{c}})$ for
all $S\in F$ where $s^{\mathrm{c}}=\Omega\backslash S$ . Note that $(v’)’=v$ and $(v+w)’=v’1-$ $w’$ .. The core of $v\in \mathbb{R}^{F}$ $\mathrm{i}$
$C(v):=$ { $x\in \mathbb{R}^{\Omega}$ : $\mathrm{x}(\mathrm{S})\geq v(S)$ for all $S\in F$ and $\mathrm{x}(\mathrm{S})=v(\Omega)$ }
where $x(S)= \sum_{\omega\in S}$ $x(\omega)$ . If $v$ is a capacity,
$C(v)=\{p\in\Delta(\Omega)$ : $p(S)\geq v(S)$ for all $S\in$ $\mathrm{F}$).
. Note that the core of a unanimity game has a simple structure:
$C(u_{T})--\{p\in\Delta(\Omega):p(T)=1\}$ .
Proposition 1 (Shapley, 1953) The set of all unanimity games $\{u\tau : T\in 7 \}$ is $a$
linear base for $\mathbb{R}^{F}$ So any $v\in \mathbb{R}^{F}$ has a unique expression of the form
$v= \sum_{T\in F}\beta_{T}u_{T}$
. (1)
Note that, for $E\in$ $\mathrm{F}$ , $\mathrm{v}\{\mathrm{E}$ ) $= \sum i_{T\subseteq E}\mathcal{B}_{T}$ and $\mathrm{v}’\{\mathrm{E}$) $= \sum_{T\cap E\neq\emptyset}\beta_{T}=\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T}$. A
game $v\in \mathbb{R}^{F}$ is said to be totally monotone if, in the unique representation (1), $\beta\tau$ is
non-negative for all $T\in \mathcal{F}$ . A totally monotone capacity is also called a belief function
(Dempster, 1967, 1968; Shafer, 1976).
The core operation is additive (in the Minkowski sum) on the set of convex gamae.1
Proposition 2 If $v$ and $w$ are convex, $C(v)+C(w)=C(v+w)$ .
Proposition 2 can be extended to non-convex games in terms of the Minkowski differ-
ence (Danilov and Koshevoy, 2000). The following result is due to Strassen (1964), which
is often cited in the literature of belief functions. Technically, it is a simple corollary of
the additivity result above, but this turns out to be a very powerful tool.
$11\mathrm{t}$ is diff cult to tell the reference to which this result should be attributed. The result is apparently
known in the operations research literature for some time. It is also known in the cooperative game
literature.
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Corollary 3 (Strassen, 1964) Let $v= \sum_{T}f\mathit{3}ru\tau$ be totally monotone. Then, $p\in$
$C(v)$ if and only if there $e$$\dot{m}tsq_{T}\in\Delta(\Omega)$ with $q\tau(T)=1$ for each $T\in F$ such that
$p= \sum_{T}\beta_{T}q_{T}$ . Equivalently,
$C(v)=5$ $\beta_{T}C(u\tau)$ .
$T\in \mathcal{F}$
2 Dempster-Shafer and maximum likelihood updating
Let $v$ be a belief function and write $v= \sum_{T}$ ($3\mathrm{r}u\tau$ where $\beta\tau\geq 0$ . Since $\mathrm{v}(\mathrm{Q})=$
$\sum_{T\in F}\beta_{T}=1,$ the collection $\{\beta_{T} : T\in \mathrm{F}\}$ defines a probability distribution over $\mathrm{y}$.
Then, Corollary 3 suggests the following interpretation of $v$ .
Imagine a decision maker who believes that $\omega$ $\in$ $\Omega$ is chosen by the following two stage
process:
1. an event $T\in$ $\mathrm{T}$ is chosen according to $\{\beta_{T} : T\in’\}$ ,
2. a state $\omega$ $\in T$ is chosen according to some $q_{T}\in\Delta(\Omega)$ with 77 (T) $=1$ , i.e.,
$q\tau\in C(u_{T})$ .
Assume that the decision maker knows $\{\mathcal{B}\tau : T\in \mathrm{F}\}$ (and thus $v$ ), but does not know
$q\tau$ for any $T\in \mathcal{F}$. Then, any probability distribution of the form
$\sum_{T}\beta_{T}q_{T}$
where $q\tau\in C(u_{T})$
is consistent with the twO-stage process. Corollary 3 says that $C(v)$ is exactly the set of
all the consistent probability functions.
Now suppose that the decision maker learns from an outside source that an event
$E\in \mathcal{F}$ has occurred. There can be many plausible ways to modify the twO-stage process
in response. The following is certainly one of them.
1. For the first stage, the decision maker should rule out any event which contradicts
$E$ : that is, discard any event $T\in$ $F$ with $T$
”
$E=\emptyset$ , i.e., $T\not\in \mathcal{F}_{E}$ .
2. For the second stage, once $T\in Fp$ has been chosen, the decision maker should
rule out any state which contradicts $E$ : that is, discard any sate $\omega$ $\not\in T$ ” $E$ .
Dempster and Shafer (Dempster, 1967, 1968; Shafer, 1976) advocated a similar line
of reasoning, and showed that the following updating rule captures this idea. The con-
ditional (or updated) capacity given $E$ with $v’(E)>0$ is defined as follows:
$v\mathrm{g}^{\mathrm{s}_{(A):=1-\frac{v’(A^{\mathrm{c}}\cap E)}{v(E)}=\frac{v(A\cup E^{\mathrm{c}})-v(E^{\mathrm{c}})}{v’(E)}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}11}}$, $A\subseteq\Omega$ , (2)
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which is often referred to as the Dempster-Shafer (DS) updating rule.
The formula (2) can be reinterpreted utilizing Corollary 3 and the two stage process
interpretation. Fix an event $E\in$ T. The conjugate $v’$ of $v$ gives $v’(E)= \sum_{T\in F_{B}}\mathcal{B}\tau$ ,
i.e., $v’(E)$ is the probability that an element in $\mathcal{F}_{E}$ is chosen in the first stage. Assume
throughout that $v’(E)>0.$
In the modified first stage when $T\in F_{E}$ is chosen, since $v’(E)= \sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta \mathrm{r}$ , it
is natural to assign a probability $\beta_{T|E}:=\beta_{T}/v’(E)$ to each $T\in \mathcal{F}_{E}$ . In the modified
second stage when $\omega\in T$ is chosen, the possibility of $\omega$ $\not\in T\cap E$ is ruled out. Thus, the
decision maker should consider probability functions of the form $\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T|E}q\mathrm{r}$ where
$q\tau\in\Delta(\Omega)$ satisfies $\mathrm{q}\mathrm{r}(\mathrm{T}\cap E)=1$ . These probability functions are exactly those in the
elements of $\sum_{T\in F_{E}}\beta_{T|}{}_{E}C(u_{T\cap E})$ , which is equal to $C( \sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T|E}u_{T\cap E})$ by Corollary
3. This observation naturally leads us to the following alternative characterization of
the DS updating rule:
Theorem 4 Let $v=7\tau$ $\beta_{T}u_{T}$ be a belief function where $\beta_{T}\geq 0$ for all $T\in F$ . Then
$v \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{S}}=\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T|E}u_{T\cap E}$
. (3)
Proof. For any $A\in F,$
$\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T|E}u_{T\cap E(A)=\frac{1}{v’(E)}\sum_{\{T\in F_{B}}}\cdot$
. $T\cap E\subseteq A$}
$\beta_{T}$
$= \overline{v’(E)}1(_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T}-\sum_{\{T\in F_{B}:A^{c}\cap(T\cap E)\neq\emptyset\}}$ Br
$= \frac{1}{v’(E)}$ ($\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T}-$ $\{"\sum_{T:T\cap(A^{\mathrm{c}}\cap}E)(@\}\beta_{T})$
The last equality holds since $T$ ” $(A^{\mathrm{c}}\cap E)\mathit{1}\mathit{1}\mathit{3}$ implies $T\cap E\mathit{1}\emptyset$ and thus $T\in \mathcal{F}_{E}$ .
Since $\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T}=$ v’{ $\mathrm{E})$ and $\sum_{\{T:T\cap(A^{e}\cap E)\neq\emptyset\}}\beta_{T}=$ CT\in F,lc\cap E $\mathcal{B}_{T}=v’(A^{\mathrm{c}}\cap E)$ , the
last expression is exactly the same as (2). $\blacksquare$
Example 1 (The DS updating for unanimity gmes) Let $v=u\tau.$ Note that $v’(E)>$
$0$ if and only if $T\cap IE\neq\emptyset$). Since $\beta_{S|E}=1$ if $S=T,$ otherwise $\beta_{S|E}=0,$ we have
$v\mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{S}}=u_{T\cap E}$ .
An advantage of thinking the DS updating rule in terms of (3) over (2) is that it
is straightforward to show that the DS updating rule is equivalent to the maximum
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likelihood updating rule over the set of probability functions $C(v)$ . For this purpose, fix
a belief function $v= \sum_{T}\beta_{T}u\tau$ and an event $E\in$ F. Define
$C_{E}(v):=\{p\in$ A(Q) : $p= \sum_{T\in F}\beta\tau q_{T}$ , $q\tau\in C(u_{T\cap E})$ if $T\in \mathcal{F}_{E}$ , $q\tau\in$ C(ur) $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\int$ .
Note that $C_{E}(v)\subseteq C(v)$ by Corollary 3.
Lemma 5 $p\in$ Ce(v) if and only if $p \in\arg\max\{p(E) : p\in C(v)\}$ . That is, Ce(v) is
the set of probability functions in $C(v)$ which maimize the likelihood of $E$ .
Proof. For any $p=$ EzT\in F ($\mathit{3}rqr$ $\in C(v)$ where $q\tau\in$ C(v).
$p(E)=5$ $\beta_{T}q_{T}(E)=T\mathit{5}E$ $\beta\tau q\tau(E)\leq\sum_{T\in F_{E}}\beta_{T}$.
The equality holds if and only if, for every $T\in$ $l_{E}$ with $\beta_{T}>0,77$ $(E)$ $=1$ , i.e.,
$q_{T}\in C(u_{T\cap E})$ . Since $\sum_{T\in F}\beta_{T}q_{T}=\sum_{T\in F}\beta_{T}\phi_{T}$ as far as $q_{T}=\phi_{T}$ for $T\in F$ with
$\beta_{T}>0,$ the lemma is proved. $\blacksquare$
Now we shall relate $C_{E}(v)$ to the DS updating rule: the DS updating rule is equivalent
to the maximum likelihood updating rule over $C(v)$ . This result is reported in Gibloa
and Schmeidler (1993) and Denneberg (1994), with different proofs.
Proposition 6 $q\in C(v_{E}^{\mathrm{D}\mathrm{S}})$ if and only if $q=p(\cdot|E)$ for some $p\in C_{E}(v)$ .
Proof. Pick any $p= \sum_{T\in F}\beta\tau q\tau\in$ Ce(v). Then, for each $A\in \mathcal{F}$, we have:
$p(A \cap E)=\sum_{T\in F}\beta\tau q\tau(A " E)$ $= \sum_{T\in r_{B}}\beta\tau q\tau(A\cap E)=\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta\tau qT(A)$
.
Indeed, the first equation holds by definition, and the second holds since $q\tau(A\cap E)\leq$
$q\tau(E)=0$ for every $T\not\in TE-$ For the last, note that $q\tau(A)\geq q_{T}$ (An $E$ ) $\geq q\tau(A\cap T\cap E)$ .
But if $T\in FE$ then $q\tau\in C(u\tau \mathrm{n}E)$ and $q\tau(A)=q\tau(A\cap T\cap E)$ , which implies $q\tau(A)=$
$q_{T}(A\cap E)$ .
Notice in particular that $p(E)= \sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T}q\tau(E)=\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T}=v’(E)$ . Thus, for
any $A$ ,
$p(A|E)=p(A \cap E)/p(E)=\frac{1}{v’(E)}\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta\tau q\tau(A)=\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T|E}q\tau(A)$
.
Thus, p( E) $\mathrm{E}$ $\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T|E}C(u_{T\cap E})=C(\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta_{T|E}u_{T\cap E})=C(v_{E}^{\mathrm{D}\mathrm{S}})$ from (3).
On the other hand, start with any $q\in C(v_{E}^{\mathrm{D}\mathrm{S}})$ , thus we can write $q= \neg_{vTE\mathrm{T}}1\sum_{T\in F_{B}}\beta\tau q\tau$
with $q_{T}\in C(u_{T\cap E})$ by (3). Fix $q_{T}\in C(u_{T})$ arbitrarily for $T$ ( 2 $E$ , and define
$\hat{p}:=\sum_{T\in \mathcal{F}}\beta_{T}q_{T}$ . Then $p\wedge\in C_{E}(v)$ by construction, and $q=\hat{p}\mathrm{C}(\mathrm{v})$ . $\blacksquare$
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Example 2 (The DS updating for unanimity games, $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{d}.$ ) If $v=u\tau$ and $T$ ”
$E\neq$ $/)$ , $p\in$ Ce(v) if and only if $p(T ” E)=$ l, which is equivalent to $p\in C(u\tau\cap E)$ .
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